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NATIONAL SECURITY, STATE SECRECY 
AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
Jason Gratl and Andrew Irvine*
Tension between national security and public accountability is present in any democ­
racy. On the one hand, national security routinely requires state secrecy, even though 
such secrecy hampers the kind of public disclosure required for citizens to judge the 
success or failure of government policy. On the other hand, public accountability 
remains a core value within any democracy and gives rise to a demand for wide­
spread public knowledge of even the most sensitive government actions and powers. 
This tension between security and accountability means that citizens are often pre­
cluded from having knowledge of, let alone participating in, activities that are cen­
tral to the well-being and preservation of their nation.
In this paper, we recognize three main ways in which governments remain sub­
ject to the will of their citizens, even in cases relating to national security. These are:
i. the rule of law;
ii. institutions designed to advance indirect accountability; and
iii. direct public accountability.
After briefly touching on the first two of these, we concentrate in some detail 
upon the third. We explore the statutory provisions constraining the flow of infor­
mation to the public, and note the effect of expansive definitions of national securi­
ty on state secrecy and public accountability. We elaborate two specific cases in 
which public accountability is compromised through state secrecy. Ultimately, we 
conclude that in Canada today, direct public accountability remains an important, but 
fragile, safeguard against the abuse of government power.
* Jason Gratl is a Vancouver litigator specializing in criminal law. He is also President of the British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association. Andrew Irvine is Professor o f Philosophy at the University of 
British Columbia.
Government Accountability and the Rule of Law
The phrase “rule of law” is used more often than it is defined. At its core is the idea 
that safeguards must exist to prevent the arbitrary or injudicious exercise of govern­
ment power.1 The rule of law is thus regularly contrasted with the exercise of arbi­
trary state power. A government bound by the rule of law (as opposed to a govern­
ment, say, whose actions are limited only by a lack of resources) is one constrained 
by non-trivial laws, principles or conventions. The rule of law is thus something 
more than the mere requirement that governments must act according to the law. 
Should a law be passed that gave a government the power to act whenever and how­
ever it saw fit, such a government would not be bound by the rule of law. The rule of 
law places genuine, non-trivial constraints upon the exercise of government power; 
it requires a prohibition on governments undertaking at least some kinds of actions; 
and it requires public demonstration that such restrictions are successfully upheld 
and enforced.
Restrictions upon government action are of two main kinds: substantive and 
procedural. Substantive restrictions designate those actions or types of actions that 
are disallowed in toto. For example, no government bound by the rule of law may 
engage in the arbitrary execution of its citizens, the arbitrary or capricious confisca­
tion or seizure of land or property,2 or the arbitrary closure of churches or other reli­
gious institutions.3 Procedural restrictions designate the actions or types of actions 
that may be permitted, but only after appropriate public consultation and scrutiny. 
For example, governments may change the criminal code or increase taxes, but only 
after they have been duly elected and they have introduced, passed and made public 
the appropriate legislation.
Understood in this way, the main advantages of the rule of law are threefold: 
individual and other types of non-governmental liberty are increased, government 
corruption is reduced, and economic prosperity is advanced. In all three cases, these 
benefits are made more likely by placing limits on the use of arbitrary state power. 
For example, by placing non-trivial restrictions on government power, the freedom 
of individuals, families, businesses, churches, synagogues, mosques and other 
groups to define and pursue their own private interests is increased. By outlawing 
certain types of government action and government corruption, the use of govern­
ment power to advance private (rather than public) interests becomes less likely. By
1 For example, see Albert Venn Dicey, Law o f the Constitution (London: MacMillan, 9th ed., 1950), 
pp.187-195, and Lon Fuller, The Morality o f Law (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1964), at pp.33ff. See also Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 750
2 Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121
3 Saumur v. City o f Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299
protecting individuals and corporations against the random seizure of their assets and 
other arbitrary measures, the kind of stability required for successful long-term 
investment and trade is made more likely.
Of course, the introduction of non-trivial restrictions upon the use of govern­
ment power means very little if there is no guarantee that these restrictions are in fact 
enforced. Hence there is the need for public scrutiny and oversight. Such oversight 
comes in two main forms: institutions designed to establish indirect accountability, 
and direct public accountability.
In the case of matters relating to national security, institutions of indirect 
accountability include, among others: the judiciary, the Security Intelligence Review 
Committee, and Parliament itself.4 All such institutions are intended to function on 
behalf of, or in proxy for, the citizenry as they attempt to ensure that government and 
its agencies remain bound by the rule of law.
Equally important, if not more so, is direct public accountability. The forms of 
direct public accountability are varied, but consist chiefly of institutionalized public 
spaces through which information may be transmitted from government sources to 
citizens. This happens in courtrooms, libraries, through the media and at administra­
tive venues such as immigration or human-rights hearings. Access to information is 
also gained through freedom-of-information requests or is transmitted directly to the 
public by way of reports, news releases or whistle blowing.
The rule of law and public accountability are, in a sense, concepts that are 
inseparable in a democracy. Seen as an aspect of democracy, the rule of law may be 
understood not only as a limit or proscription on the activities of governing forces, 
but also as the ongoing activity of justifying state action and institutions through pub­
lic discourse and reason.5 It is the participation of citizens in a discourse of legality 
that bestows upon these institutions the honour of legitimately establishing the law. 
The flow of information is thus integral to the rule of law.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, Canadians have caught a glimpse of just 
how difficult it can be to obtain direct public accountability in cases relating to the
4 For a discussion of institutions of indirect accountability, see Commission o f Inquiry into the Actions 
o f  Canadian Officials in Relation to Mahar Arar: Accoutability and Transparency; A Background 
Paper to the Commission’s Consulation Report, December 10, 2004. This paper is available online at 
<www.ararcommission.ca/eng/accountability%20and%20Transparency.pdf>
5 Hamish Stewart argues for the necessity of a robust notion of the rule of law as a part o f any mecha­
nism o f review for claims of public interest immunity under the Canada Evidence Act. Hamish Stewart, 
“Rule o f Law or Executive Fiat” in The Security o f Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill. 
Eds. Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem, and Kent Roach (University of Toronto Press), 2002, at 
pp.217-237. However, Professor Stewart does not argue for the necessity o f direct public accountabil­
ity.
shadowy world of national security. Several events in the past few years have exhib­
ited the tension between public accountability and the often-perceived need for state 
secrecy. Four in particular stand out. The first occurred during the Air India trial 
when Crown Prosecutors attempted covertly to examine an uncooperative witness 
using the investigative hearing process created under the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001. 
Meeting resistance, the case ultimately found its way to the Supreme Court of 
Canada.6 The second occurred when, in an attempt to prevent future terrorist activi­
ties, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued Security Certificates under 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) to deport five men of middle- 
eastern descent. While little or no evidence was made public that any of the men are 
a threat to Canada’s national security, the government purported to rely on significant 
secret evidence.7 The third was also related to the use (or misuse) of Security 
Certificates, this time in connection with the deportation of a notorious German anti- 
semite, Ernst Zundel.8 The fourth occurred when the R.C.M.P. provided information 
about a Canadian citizen, Mahar Arar, to the United States, allegedly knowing that 
he would be sent to Syria to be tortured. Despite the fact that a Commission of 
Inquiry was established to look into the facts of the case, the federal government has 
consistently attempted to prevent the public release of information about its involve­
ment in this case.9 In what follows, we pay special attention to the first and third of 
these four cases. We believe they are representative of the ways in which secret gov­
ernment powers can be misused.
The paradoxical tension between national security and democratic accounta­
bility is most sharply felt during cases in which there is wide publication of potential 
abuse of authority. Where publicity stimulates public awareness, a demand emerges 
for the release of information underlying the impugned government action. 
Information withheld on the basis that its release would be injurious to national secu­
rity forecloses the possibility of vindication or justification for that action, especial­
ly when national security is perceived as a pretext to avoid public scrutiny of malfea­
sance.
Judicial influence in these types of cases has been mixed, ev;i\ contradictory. 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the presumption of 
open, public courtrooms applies even in relation to terrorism offences.10 On the other
6 Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332
7 See, for example, Re Charkaoui, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1815
8 Re Zundel, [2004] F.C.J. No. 60,and [2005] F.C. 295
9 For an example of such skirmishes, see Canada. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar. Ruling on National Security Confidentiality (December 20, 2004). 
online at: <http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/finalrulingonnscREDACTED_Dec20.pdf>
10 Re Vancouver Sun, supra note 6.
hand, the Court presented an expanded definition of the term “national security” and 
accepted a generally deferential approach to national security issues,11 which can 
only serve to facilitate greater state secrecy.
National Security
In Canada, there is no single definition of “national security.” Rather, a constellation 
of related statutory definitions and judicially defined terms trigger secrecy in the 
exercise of state power. The statutory provisions are often intricate and inter-defined, 
and there exist various textual subtleties. Even so, without trying to be exhaustive 
and at the risk of oversimplification, “national security” and its cognate phrases 
emerge in important and relevant ways in each of the following pieces of legislation:
i. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSISA) defines four 
aspects of the phrase “threats to the security of Canada”: espionage or sab­
otage; clandestine, deceptive or threatening foreign-influenced activities; 
serious violence against persons or property for a political, religious or 
ideological objective; and acts directed towards the destruction or illegal 
overthrow of the government.12 Lawful advocacy, protest and dissent are 
explicitly excluded.
Most notably, the CSISA definition triggers the institutional power to deny 
access-to-information requests from members of the public under the 
Access to Information Act.13 Similarly, an institution may refuse disclo­
sure under the Privacy Act (PA) if the information requested was obtained 
or prepared in the course of investigations into activities constituting 
“threats to the security of Canada” within the CSISA definition of this 
phrase.14
The CSISA definition also gives the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) jurisdiction to collect and retain information, and the 
Attorney General of Canada jurisdiction to prosecute offenders.15 
Reasonable grounds in the presence of a CSISA “threat” also trigger an 
impressive range of powers designed to allow governments to deal with
11 Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3
12 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S. 1985, c.C-23, s.2
13 Access to Information Act, R.S. 1985, c.A-1, s,16(a)(iii)
14 Privacy Act, R.S. 1985, c.P-21, s.22. See, generally, Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 3
15 Security Offences Act, R.S. 1985 c.S-7, s.2
“public order emergencies” under the Emergencies Act.16 Finally, the 
CSISA definition triggers reporting requirements by FINTRAC, the finan­
cial transactions information clearinghouse.17
ii. The Access to Information Act (AIA) defines the “defence of Canada or 
any state allied or associated with Canada” as any acts or efforts to detect, 
prevent or suppress actual or potential attack or aggression by a foreign 
state.18 Similarly it defines “subversive or hostile activities” as including 
espionage, sabotage, activities directed toward terrorist acts, changing 
government with violence or force, and gathering intelligence. These AIA 
definitions also trigger the institutional power to refuse an access-to-infor- 
mation request.
iii. The Security o f Information Act (SIA) establishes as an offence the retain­
ing or distributing of information for a purpose “prejudicial to the safety 
or interests of the State.”19 In this context, a purpose is deemed prejudi­
cial to the safety or interests of the state whenever a person engages in an 
indictable offence or terrorist activity, endangers lives or threatens the 
ability of the government to preserve the sovereignty, security or territori­
al integrity of the state, or is involved in a long list of other acts impairing 
the functioning of government.20 The SIA also requires a person to be per­
manently bound to secrecy if served with notice, in writing, that such 
action would be in the interests of “national security.”21 Within the act, the 
term “national security” is not further defined.
iv. The Canada Evidence Act (CEA) prevents the disclosure of “potentially 
injurious information” and “sensitive information” in an otherwise open 
courtroom or within an otherwise unrestricted administrative proceed­
ing.22 “Potentially injurious information” is defined as “information of a 
type that, if it were disclosed to the public, could injure international rela­
tions or national defence or national security.”23 “Sensitive information” 
is defined as “information relating to international relations or national
16 Emergencies Act, R.S., 1985, c.22, part II, ss.16-26
17 Proceeds o f Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, 2000, c.17, s.55.1
18 Access to Information Act, R.S. 1985, c.A-1, s.15
19 Security o f Information Act, R.S. 1985, R.S. 1985, c.O-5, s.4
20 Ibid, R.S. 1985, c.O-5, s.3
21 Ibid, s. 10
22 Canada Evidence Act, R.S. 1985 c.C-5, ss.38.01 and 38.02
23 Ibid.
defence or national security that ... the Government of Canada is taking 
measures to safeguard.”24 Again, the phrase “national security” is not fur­
ther defined.
In this context, the classification of information as “potentially injurious” 
or “sensitive” triggers a morass of procedural obligations, including a pro­
hibition on the introduction of evidence without notice being given to the 
Attorney General of Canada. Potentially it can also require a Federal 
Court application to gain permission to introduce such evidence.25
v. The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) eliminates an individual’s right to access government informa­
tion about himself or herself, and prevents the Federal Privacy 
Commissioner from revealing or retaining information about an individ­
ual upon receipt of a Certificate issued by the Attorney General of Canada 
under section 38.13 of the CEA.26 The CEA permits such a Certificate to 
be issued “for the purpose of protecting national defence or national secu­
rity.”27
vi. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) enables the deporta­
tion of non-Canadian citizens without many of the bedrock due-process 
protections taken for granted in the criminal context, including the right of 
disclosure of the case, the right to be present at one’s hearing, and the right 
to confront one’s accusers once a so-called “Security Certificate” has been 
issued.28 In such circumstances, a person is not entitled to see any evi­
dence determined by the judge to be “injurious to national security.”29 
Once again, the phrase “national security” remains undefined.
The public flow of information relating to national security is thus significant­
ly curtailed by the combined effects of CSISA, AIA, SI A, CEA, PIPED A and IRPA. In 
all cases, perceived threats to national security trigger the government’s right or obli­
gation to withhold what is otherwise considered public information from its citizens. 
Public accountability thus decreases dramatically as the definition of “national secu­
rity” expands.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000, c.5, s.4.1
27 Canada Evidence Act, R.S. 1985 c.C-5, s.38.13(l)
28 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c.27, ss.76-87
29 Ibid.
Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship & Immigration)
The Supreme Court of Canada set out its initial reaction to the events of September 
11, 2001, in the Suresh case, released on January 11, 2002. The decision concerned 
the Security Certificate deportation of a member and fundraiser of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a resistance group fighting for a separate homeland in Sri 
Lanka. As we shall see, the rhetorical approach of the Court signalled extreme def­
erence to executive decision makers, almost to the point of delinquency.
At the heart of the Suresh case is a ruling that the (then-titled) Minister of 
Immigration retains the discretion to deport persons at risk of torture only under 
exceptional circumstances.30 In reaching its decision, the Court introduced a new and 
expansive definition of national security having significant implications in the realm 
of public accountability.31
In Suresh, the Court expanded the definition of “threat to the security of 
Canada” in the context of the Security Certificate powers set out in IRPA's prede­
cessor statute, the Immigration Act.32 The elaboration was intended to answer the 
claim that the phrase “danger to the security of Canada” was unconstitutionally 
vague. After acknowledging that the phrase is “difficult to define ... highly fact- 
based and political in a general sense,” the Court stated the following:
Whatever the historic validity of insisting on direct proof of specific danger to 
the deporting country, as matters have evolved, we believe courts must now con­
clude that the support of terrorism abroad raises a possibility of adverse reper­
cussions on Canada’s security ...: see Rehman, supra, per Lord Slynn of Hadley, 
at paras.16-17. International conventions must be interpreted in light of current 
conditions. It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in one coun­
try did not necessarily implicate other countries. But after the year 2001, that 
approach is no longer valid.
First, the global transport and money networks that feed terrorism abroad have 
the potential to touch all countries, including Canada, and to thus implicate them 
in the terrorist activity. Second, terrorism itself is a worldwide phenomenon. The 
terrorist cause may focus on a distant locale, but the violent acts that support it 
may be close at hand. Third, preventative or precautionary state action may be
30 Suresh, supra, at para. 78
31 In addition to its effect on IRPA, Suresh has a direct effect on SI A and CEA (where the phrase 
“national security” is also found) and can be said to have a ripple effect on related security definitions.
32 The most significant amendment to the Security Certificate regime by the IRPA was the elimination 
of the right to appeal determinations of the Federal Court as to the reasonableness o f Security 
Certificates.
justified; not only an immediate threat but also possible future risks may be con­
sidered. Fourth, Canada’s national security may be promoted by reciprocal coop­
eration between Canada and other states in combating international terrorism.
These considerations lead us to conclude that to insist on direct proof of a spe­
cific threat to Canada as the test for “danger to the security of Canada” is to set 
the bar too high. There must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to 
Canada. But the threat need not be direct; rather it may be grounded in distant 
events that indirectly have a real possibility of harming Canadian security ...
These considerations lead us to conclude that a person constitutes a “danger to 
the security of Canada” if he or she poses a serious threat to the security of 
Canada, whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that the securi­
ty of one country is often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat 
must be “serious,” in the sense that it must be grounded on objectively reason­
able suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the threatened harm must 
be substantial rather than negligible.33
Reading these comments together, a person could be considered “a threat to the secu­
rity of Canada” if an objectively reasonable suspicion of an indirect threat exists, 
even to a foreign nation. The standard is akin to the “articulable cause” standard in 
criminal law.34 Effectively, the same standard of proof empowering a police officer 
to pull over a passing vehicle allows a judge to deport someone as a threat to 
Canada’s national security.
In Suresh, the Court’s attention was drawn chiefly to powers of deportation; no 
mention was made of the implications of the expanded definition of “national secu­
rity” in the area of state secrecy. While we would hope that its precedential value will 
be limited by future decisions, Suresh may inadvertently have expanded the range of 
“national security” concerns that may restrict the dissemination of information. 
Extrapolating to the latter context, the standard in Suresh suggests that information 
will cease to flow to the public when there is just a suspicion of indirect harm to 
national (or international) security. The effect on public accountability is thus poten­
tially catastrophic, and invites a critical approach to Suresh.
Suresh trades in the coinage that, since September 11, 2001, the world has wit­
nessed significant changes. Perhaps because the oral and written argument in Suresh 
antedated September 11, 2001, the Court fails to list these changes or provide any 
evidentiary support for its comments. Instead, the Court identifies a risk that Canada 
could perhaps be implicated in terrorist activity or that terrorist activity could occur
33 Suresh, supra, at paras. 87-90
34 See R. v. Jacques, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312, or, more recently, R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59
close to home. However, the mere identification of a risk is inadequate to support the 
Court’s conclusions. As Ronald Dworkin points out:
Rights would be worthless -  and the idea o f a right incomprehensible -  unless 
respecting rights meant taking some risk. We can and must try to limit those 
risks, but some risk will remain. It may be that we would be marginally more 
secure if  we decided to care nothing for the human rights o f anyone else. That is 
true in domestic policy as well. We run a marginally increased risk of violent 
deaths at the hands o f murderers every day by insisting on rights for accused 
criminals in order to keep faith with our own humanity. For the same reason we 
must run a marginally increased risk of terrorism as well. O f course we must 
sharpen our vigilance, but we must also discipline our fear.35
To rephrase for the Canadian context, it is the extent or degree of risk, not the mere 
existence of risk, which needs to be balanced against the cost of prophylaxis. We 
must also add that increased state powers do not exist without their own risks. Every 
increase in unaccountability brings with it its own risk of abuse.
Unsupported concerns dealing with September 11, 2001 manifested them­
selves in the Court’s general comments in Suresh to the effect that the national secu­
rity climate is defined by a clash of two opposing values:
On the one hand stands the manifest evil of terrorism and the random and arbi­
trary taking of innocent lives, rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of loss and 
fear. Governments, expressing the will of the governed, need the legal tools to 
effectively meet this challenge.
On the other hand stands the need to ensure that those legal tools do not under­
mine our democratic society’s fundamental values: liberty, the rule of law, and 
the principles of fundamental justice. These values lie at the heart of the 
Canadian constitutional order and the international instruments that Canada has 
signed. In the end, it would be a Pyrric victory if terrorism were defeated at the 
cost of sacrificing our commitment to those values.36
There is no doubt that liberty, the rule of law, and the principles of fundamental jus­
tice serve as the bedrock of the Canadian legal system. However, the same cannot be 
said for the proposition that terrorism is “rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of 
loss and fear.” The Court does not refer to a factual record or empirical study to sup­
35 Ronald Dworkin, “Terror and the Attack on Civil Liberties,” The New York Review o f Books 50:17 
(6 November 2003), online: NY Review of Books at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16738>
36 Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 3 and 4
port the existence of an “ever-widening spiral.” This departs from the usual require­
ment that Charter issues be decided on a piecemeal basis in an evidentiary context.
It is tempting (or even charitable) to dismiss the “ever-widening spiral” atti­
tude as a moment of rhetorical weakness or, as one writer puts it, “a political answer 
to a hard case.”37 Regrettably, there is greater significance. In Kent Roach’s article, 
“Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in 
the Face of Terrorism,” Roach concludes:
I do not deny that Canadian law, courts, sovereignty and democracy all face dif­
ficult challenges in the wake of the awful crimes of September 11. But the idea 
that September 11 changed everything must be rejected. It must be rejected not 
only to preserve our Canadian values, but also to do justice to the world that 
existed before that awful day. Well before September 11, we had entered a realm 
in which it was clear that neither fundamental principles of the law, nor the 
courts, nor the border would save us from ourselves. The lack o f guarantees does 
not mean that the struggle to preserve fundamental legal principles, a healthy 
democracy, or Canadian sovereignty are futile; indeed it makes the struggle more 
pressing and vital. That we have seen and survived similar threats in the past also 
provides some grounds for cautious optimism.38
Indeed, we should call for cautious optimism, but only once it is recognized that 
internal threats to public accountability and the rule of law are just as significant as 
external threats to national security. In particular, we should consider carefully 
whether any real change of circumstances occurred that would justify an increase in 
state secrecy. Without doubt it has become necessary for us to respond to the great 
events of our day; but it remains equally important that we not lose sight of more 
mundane threats, threats whose very ubiquity raises them to a level of importance 
equal to, or greater than, that of the terrorist.
Vancouver Sun (Re)
Two years following Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to 
address directly the issue of public accountability in Re Vancouver Sun.39 The deci­
sion was a companion to Re Application Under s.83.28 o f the Criminal Code40
37 Peter J. Carver, “Shelter from the Storm: A Comment on Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship 
and Immigration)” (2002) 40 ALta. L. Rev. 465 at para. 74 (QL).
38 Kent Roach, “Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the 
Face of Terrorism,” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 893 at para. 82 (QL).
39 Re Vancouver Sun, supra note 4.
40 Re Application Under s.83.28 o f the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 (S.C.C.)
which, after extending use and derivative-use immunity to include deportation and 
extradition matters, had determined that investigative hearings established by the 
Anti-terrorism Act complied with minimum Charter guarantees.
The judicial investigative hearing related to two acts of terrorism that occurred 
on June 23,1985. The first was an explosion at Narita Airport in Japan that killed two 
baggage handlers. The second was an explosion that caused Air India Flight 182 to 
crash off the west coast of Ireland, killing all 329 passengers and crew. At the time 
of the application for the investigative hearing, the trial of two men accused of the 
Air India bombing had been underway for two weeks. The witness sought for inves­
tigative examination was a scheduled witness who had refused to cooperate with 
Crown prosecutors.41 The procedural facts underlying the Re Vancouver Sun case are 
a disturbing example of how easily the public can be kept in the dark on issues of 
national security.
The Air India trial itself began on April 28, 2003. On May 6, 2003, the Crown 
applied to a judge ex parte for a s.83.28 of the Criminal Code order to gather infor­
mation from an anonymous individual referred to as “the Named Person.” Associate 
Chief Justice Dohm issued the order, directing that the hearing be held in camera 
without notice to the Air India accused, the press or the public. The Named Person 
was also prohibited from disclosing any information or evidence obtained at the 
hearing.
Prior to holding the investigative hearing, counsel for the accused somehow 
became aware of the order and advised ACJ Dohm that they wished to make sub­
missions. The Named Person advised that he wanted to challenge the constitutional 
validity of s.83.28. Submissions were set down before Judge Holmes for July 27, 
2003. Neither the public nor the press was given notice.
On July 27, a reporter from the Vancouver Sun noticed Air India lawyers enter­
ing a closed courtroom. Counsel for the Sun was quickly summoned and knocked on 
the closed courtroom door. He was informed that the Judge would not hear a motion 
at that time. The Sun filed a motion with the courthouse Registry to open the court­
room to the public but the Charter challenge and the investigative hearing took place 
before the Sun ’5 application was set down. When the courtroom opened, Holmes, J. 
delivered a synopsis of her reasons dismissing the challenge to the constitutional 
validity of the investigative hearing. She proceeded to hear and dismiss the Sun’s 
application that it be allowed further access to the pleadings and for a declaration that 
the investigative hearing should not proceed in camera.
41 The Defence argued that the Crown’s use o f the investigative hearing was a colourable attempt to 
obtain pre-trial examination of the witness. The Crown argued that it wanted only to investigate the 
offence.
The appeal proceeded directly to the Supreme Court of Canada by way of s.40 
of the Supreme Court Act. The appeal was heard in open court subject to restrictions 
preventing counsel from mentioning the name, gender or facts that could identify the 
Named Person, and any of the material supporting the application for an investiga­
tive hearing. The hearing was not broadcast on CPAC.
In the result, the Court confirmed that the open court principle remains a hall­
mark of a democratic society. It also confirmed that openness applies to all judi­
cial proceedings,42 including those aimed at investigating terrorism offences:
Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality of courts.
It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and the public’s under­
standing o f the administration of justice. Moreover, openness is a principal com­
ponent of the legitimacy of the judicial process and why the parties and the pub­
lic at large abide by the decisions of courts.43
In accordance with the usual procedure, the Court placed the burden to displace the 
presumption of open courtrooms on the person seeking to restrain publicity. A judge 
may close the courtroom, or impose a publication ban or confidentiality order when
i. such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper 
administration of justice because reasonable alternative measures will not 
prevent the risk; and
ii. the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects 
on the rights and interest of the parties and the public, including the effects 
on the right to free expression, the right of an accused to a fair and public 
trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.44
The Court distinguished between the application to hold an investigative hear­
ing under s.83.28, and the holding of the hearing itself. Section 83.28(2) provides 
that the application is ex parte and by its nature must be held in camera. On the more 
difficult question of openness during the investigative hearing itself, the Court reject­
ed the notion of presumptively secret hearings, subject to the following caveat:
[the presumption of openness] should only be displaced upon proper considera­
tion of the competing interests at every stage of the process. In that spirit, the 
existence o f an order made under s.83.28, and as much o f its subject matter as
42 Citing Attorney General o f Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175; Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta 
(Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326
43 Re Vancouver Sun, supra note 4,at para. 25
44 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442,, 
Re Vancouver Sun, supra note 4 at para. 29.
possible should be made public unless, under the balancing exercise of the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test, secrecy becomes necessary ...
It may very well be that by necessity large parts o f judicial investigative hear­
ings will be held in secret. It may also very well be that the very existence of 
these hearings will at times have to be kept secret. It is too early to determine, in 
reality, how many hearings will be resorted to and what form they will take. This 
is an entirely novel procedure, and this is the first case -  to our knowledge -  in 
which it has been used.45
Although the presumption of open courtrooms was held to apply equally to the inves­
tigative hearing context, future cases will show how burdensome it is to displace that 
presumption. In Re Vancouver Sun, the Court held that the since so much of the infor­
mation relating to the investigation was already in the public domain, and since the 
investigative hearing was held in the midst of an ongoing non-jury trial, there was no 
case to be made for extensive secrecy.
Perhaps the key to understanding the Court’s insistence on the presumption of 
openness is their understanding of the purpose of investigative hearings. In the Re 
Vancouver Sun companion case, Re Application under s.83.28 o f the Criminal Code, 
the Crown urged the Court to find that the purpose of the investigative hearing should 
be regarded broadly as the protection of “national security.”46 In contrast to their 
treatment of “national security” in Suresh, the Court found as follows:
We believe that this characterization has the potential to go too far and would 
have implications that far outstrip legislative intent. The discussions surrounding 
the legislation and the legislative language itself clearly demonstrate that the Act 
purports to provide means by which terrorism may be prosecuted and prevented.
As we cautioned above, courts must not fall prey to the rhetorical urgency of a 
perceived emergency or an altered security paradigm. While the threat posed by 
terrorism is certainly more tangible in the aftermath of global events such as 
those perpetrated in the United States, and since then elsewhere, including very 
recently in Spain, we must not lose sight o f the particular aims of the legislation.
The Court concludes that an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence is not nec­
essarily an issue of “national security.” Coupled with Re Vancouver Sun, Re 
Application under s.83.28 o f the Criminal Code represents a partial retreat from the 
Suresh attitude that September 11 ushered in a new era marked by an “ever-widen- 
ing spiral of loss and fear.” Although Re Application upheld the constitutionality of 
the investigative hearing process, the openness of the hearing will serve to discour­
45 Re Vancouver Sun, supra note 4, at para. 41
46 Re Application under s.83.28 o f the Criminal Code, [2004] 2. S.C.R. 248 at para. 39
age collateral uses and abuses of the provision such as apparently occurred in Air 
India.
Re Vancouver Sun is a fetching example of the kind of mischief that thrives in 
the shadows, and a telling reminder of the need for vigilance and public accounta­
bility. The Crown’s attempt to examine an uncooperative witness covertly under oath 
was characterized by counsel for the accused as an abuse of process. A minority of 
the Court accepted this characterization.47 Until overturned, the presumption of 
secrecy at the British Columbia Supreme Court threatened to provide shelter for the 
Crown’s tactical shenanigans.
Although Canadians should see the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the pre­
sumption of openness in courtrooms as a positive step, we must recall that the expan­
sive definition of national security in Suresh may facilitate the displacement of that 
presumption without significant evidence. Re Vancouver Sun is at best a cause for 
guarded optimism.
Security Certificates
If the potential for abuse sheltered by secrecy is visible in relation to inves­
tigative hearings, it is fully radiant in relation to Security Certificates. Security 
Certificates are intended to be a fast-track process under the IRPA for deporting non­
citizens who are considered a threat to national security. If the Immigration Minister 
and the Solicitor General believe an individual is a threat to national security, they 
may issue a Security Certificate authorizing a person’s immediate detention and 
deportation. The deportee may initiate a judicial review in Federal Court to test the 
“reasonableness” of the Certificate, but will usually be detained in custody pending 
the outcome of the hearing.48
At the hearing into the reasonableness of the Certificate, the person named in 
the Certificate has a right to be heard regarding their deportation.49 However, this is
47 Ibid., at para. 167
48 See Re Charkaoui, [2005] A.C.F. No. 269 (F.T.C.); compare with Jaballah v. Canada (Minister o f  
Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No. 420
49 In Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister o f Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the predecessor Security-Certificate regime, which did not provide the 
deportee with an opportunity to be heard, comports with the principles of fundamental justice under s.7 
of the Charter. Sopinka, J. wrote that Parliament was not required to hold any hearing into the matter 
whatsoever, and that the process adequately balanced the competing interests of the State and individ­
uals. The decision has been criticized: see John A. Dent, “No Right of Appeal: Bill C - ll , Criminality 
and the Human Rights of Permanent Residents Facing Deportation” (2002) 27 Queen’s LJ. 749 at 
para. 39. As Chiarelli involved a Security Certificate issued on the basis of prior conviction for serious 
criminal offence (with due process attending the conviction), it is arguable that it has no application to 
an inadmissibility certificate for which there is no underlying due process protection.
a ‘hearing’ in name only; there is a limited right to disclosure of the evidence, and 
evidentiary and procedural limitations are placed on the deportee’s participation at 
the hearing. Among other failings, the person has no right to reasonable bail, no right 
to appeal, no right to cross-examine or confront witnesses, no right to disclosure of 
the evidence, or even to attend the hearing.
The IRPA grants a person named in the Certificate a summary of the informa­
tion or evidence in advance of the hearing “that enables them to be reasonably 
informed of the circumstances giving rise to the Certificate.”50 However, IRPA ss.78 
(b), (e) and (h) restrict the Judge from providing the person with any information that 
“would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person if disclosed.” 
To determine what would be injurious to national security, the designated judge 
reviews the protected information and holds one or more hearings in which only the 
representatives of the Ministers and their counsel are present.51 The determination as 
to what information should be disclosed is not subject to appeal.52 The IRPA thus rep­
resents a significant obstacle to the flow of information to the person subject to the 
Certificate and to the public.
If the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration or the Solicitor General 
requests that all or part of the information or evidence should be heard in the absence 
of the person named in the Certificate and his or her counsel, subsection 78(e) 
requires the judge to exclude that person and his or her counsel if the judge is of the 
opinion that its disclosure would be injurious to national security or the safety of any 
person. Members of the public are, of course, also excluded from the hearing. Not 
only is the flow of information to the subject of the Certificate stopped, but the light 
of publicity is not permitted to penetrate the process.
The requirement to reasonably inform a named person of the circumstances 
giving rise to the Certificate falls far below the scrupulous standard of disclosure in 
criminal cases.53 Subject to certain exceptions, persons accused of a Criminal Code 
offence must be informed of the case against them, and must be provided all relevant 
information by the prosecutor and investigators, even if the information is exculpa­
tory.
so IRPA, supra note 28, s.78.
51 See Re Charkaoui, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1815, in which the designated judge refused to disclose even 
the dates on which he and the Ministers’ representatives and counsel had met in secret to deal with the 
case, on the basis that it was conceivable that the information could be turned to subversive ends. The 
ruling is in keeping with the Federal Court’s propensity to err on the side of secrecy.
52 Zundel v. Canada, [2004] B.C.J. No. 608 (F.C.A.)
53 R v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 329 at para. 19: “there is a general duty on the part of the Crown 
to disclose all material it proposes to use at trial and especially all evidence which may assist the 
accused even if the Crown does not propose to adduce it.”
Even on the degraded standard of disclosure in Certificate cases, the dual statu­
tory imperatives of disclosure and secrecy are contradictory. The requirement that the 
deportee be “reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the Certificate” 
conflicts with the requirement that the judge withhold information believed to be 
injurious to national security. In some cases at least, withholding information will be 
considered necessary for security reasons even though no person without that infor­
mation could be considered reasonably informed. In those circumstances, likely not 
infrequent, the judge will no doubt err on the side of national security and the poten­
tial deportee will not be reasonably informed on the circumstances giving rise to the 
Certificate.
Section 78(f) of the IRPA provides the Minister with extraordinary power to 
demand the return of information from the designated Judge if the Judge intends to 
provide the information to the person named in the Certificate. In those circum­
stances, the judge is precluded from considering that information in determining 
whether the Certificate is reasonable. Effectively, the Minister retains editorial dis­
cretion over the summary of the evidence provided to the deportee, provided the 
Minister is prepared to forgo reliance on that information at the hearing.
To date, courts have upheld the process on the basis that detainees held under 
IRPA are entitled to a diminished level of Charter protection. In Ahani v. Canada 
(T.D.), [1995] 3 F.C. 669, and again in Re Charkaoui, [2003] F.C. 1419, the Court 
adopted a contextual approach to section 7 of the Charter, stating that the imperatives 
of immigration policy must govern the context. In particular, the rights of non-citi­
zens who do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country must be 
balanced against national security issues, such as the prevention of terrorism and the 
protection of informants.
The case of Ernst Zundel provides a helpful illustration of the failures of the 
closed courtroom in this context.54 A Certificate was issued for Zundel in May, 2003 
on the basis that he constituted a threat to national security. The government 
acknowledged that Zundel had never openly espoused violence and, indeed, that he 
had encouraged the non-violent dissemination of his opprobrious ideas. Even so, it 
also pointed out that he was linked to various groups that have used violence in the 
past. Zundel denied that he advocates violence and denied any participation in vio­
lent racist groups. The Globe and Mail reported on November 4, 2004, that the U.S.
54 Zundel is reviled for his anti-Semitic comments, for publicly lauding Hitler and for his denials of the 
Jewish Holocaust. He has never been convicted under Canada’s hate speech legislation, but he has been 
successfully sued for contravening Human Rights legislation. The authors believe that the wilful 
attempt to promote hatred against an identifiable group is immoral, but we also maintain that in a 
democracy expressions that give form to such attempts must be protected from legal sanction or 
obstruction.
Federal Bureau of Investigation closed its file on Zundel in 2001 after deciding he 
was not a security threat.55
In this context, the challenge to the open courtroom principle, and the chal­
lenge to executive and judicial accountability, is the Crown’s assertion that most of 
the evidence establishing that Zundel is a threat to national security cannot be dis­
closed to Zundel or to the general public because the release of that evidence would 
itself threaten national security. The Honourable Judge Blais, designated to preside 
over the hearing into the reasonableness of the Certificate, put the difficulty in deter­
mining whether Zundel’s continued detention was warranted on the basis of nation­
al security as follows:56
Mr Zundel’s activities have in large part been public. In the context of these pub­
lic endeavors, Mr Zundel has never advocated violence ...
However, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Zundel is a danger to 
national security ... Although Mr Zundel has virtually no history of direct per­
sonal engagement in acts of serious violence, his status within the White 
Supremacist Movement is such that adherents are inspired to carry out his acts 
in pursuance of his ideology. The Ministers believe that by his comportment as 
leader and ideologue, Mr Zundel intends serious violence to be a consequence of  
his influence ...
Mr Zundel was questioned about a number of people who are part of a danger­
ous and violent movement, here and abroad, and in every instance, he charac­
terized the relationship as basically superficial, transient, without consequence, 
and with no funding involved.57 There is too much evidence to ignore what is 
obvious. What I have seen in camera ,58 and what I heard in Court from Mr 
Zundel, are completely at odds. Mr Zundel wields much more power within the 
right-wing, extremist and violent movement known as the White Supremacist 
Movement (however defined, the only concern for me being the danger it repre­
sents to society) than he lets on. He would have us believe that he is only inter­
ested in ideas, and that others use his ideas as they see fit, a situation for which 
he cannot be responsible.
55 The FBI file was released as a result o f a US freedom-of-information request.
56 Re Zundel, [2004] F.C.J. No. 60
57 The procedure underlying Zundel’s testimony ensured that he was unable to view or directly respond 
to the evidence brought forward against him. That is not to say that he would have had a satisfactory 
response, if given an opportunity to speak directly to that evidence. Under the Security Certificate 
regime however, the public could never know.
58 In this context, the phrase “in camera" refers to a courtroom that is closed to both the public and to 
the person named in the Security Certificate.
The information made available to me paints an entirely different picture ... the 
evidence points to his own direct involvement with groups he pretends to know 
very little about...
The Ministers have provided considerable evidence, that cannot be disclosed for 
reasons o f national security, that Mr Zundel has extensive contacts within the 
violent racist and extremist movement. Mr Zundel stated in his testimony that he 
knows the following people slightly, or had professional contacts with them, or 
had interviewed them as a reporter. Information showed, rather, that he had dealt 
with them a great deal more, in some cases had funded their activities, and gen­
erally had maintained much closer ties than what he had admitted to in his exam­
ination or cross-examination. [Blais, J. then provides a list of names of racists 
from Canada and abroad] ...
Thus, while overtly condemning the use o f violence, he covertly condones it by 
maintaining his contact and credibility with groups that advocate and engage in 
violent acts.
It is plain that the Honourable Judge Blais detained Zundel on the basis of evidence 
to which he and the Minister alone were privy. Through his ruling, Judge Blais advis­
es the public that Zundel has misrepresented himself and that the truth, as revealed 
by the secret evidence, is that Zundel is a threat to national security.
The disparity between public and secret records in Zundel’s case brings the 
problems with closed courtrooms and secret evidence into sharp relief. Zundel and 
his lawyers, possibly supported by the FBI, ask the public to believe one version of 
the truth; the Minister and Solicitor General ask the public to believe another version 
of the truth. A closed courtroom fails to ensure accountability and inspire confidence 
in the judicial result.59
The Security Certificate regime permits the factual basis for the deportation 
order to be impervious to public evaluation. Unable to assess the propriety of the 
judicial reasoning, the public may be forced to withhold its assent to this judicial 
action. In a secular state, faith in the judiciary cannot cloak the order with legitima­
cy. Even in the distasteful case of Ernst Zundel, of whom many would gladly see the
59 Zundel’s case is not unique in raising questions about the integrity of the Security Certificate process. 
In Re Ikhlef, Justice Blais upheld a Security Certificate on the undisclosed basis o f evidence o f associ­
ations between the respondent and members o f al-Qaeda, despite the respondent’s protests of mistak­
en identity: Re Ikhlef, [2002] F.C.J. No. 352. In Re Charkaoui, the person named in the Certificate was 
alleged to be a “sleeper cell” member of al-Qaeda. Again, however, Mr Charkaoui asserted publicly 
that he was merely a pizza-store owner and voluntarily submitted to lie-detector tests. In the lead-up to 
his hearing, Mr Charkaoui was detained for over two years.
last, Security Certificates provide a stark example of the potential for erosion of insti­
tutional legitimacy and the need for public accountability.
Concluding Remarks
Abuse of government secrecy laws is possible and may even be inevitable. The wider 
the use of ministerial privileges and other governmental powers associated with 
national security, the greater the risk that errors will be made through carelessness or 
for reasons of political expediency. There is also the risk that Canada’s system of jus­
tice will begin to lose credibility in the eyes of its citizens. To be sure, institutions of 
indirect accountability remain valuable. In many cases they are reliable, and are 
known to be such. However, when questions of confidence arise, nothing can replace 
direct public accountability as a means of restoring public confidence.
Secret evidence, and ex parte and in camera Security Certificate proceedings, 
hinge on the definition of the phrase “national security.” But the phrase’s ambiguity 
gives rise to serious worries about ministerial and judicial power. In recent months, 
the degree of ministerial discretion has become so high and court decisions have 
become so unpredictable that there is a genuine danger that public confidence in the 
administration of justice will begin to be eroded.
The tension between security and accountability may never be capable of full 
resolution. Even so, improvements are both possible and desirable. To begin, at the 
level of the rule of law, it is true that no government can be bound by laws that are 
vague or ambiguous. The rule of law requires that genuine constraints be placed upon 
the exercise of government power. Yet if so, laws and definitions must be precise to 
a high degree. In particular, the current collection of unrelated definitions of “nation­
al security” should be reworked to ensure a more uniform and principled release of 
information to the public. The definitions should be closely tailored to protect spe­
cific categories of information and should be precise enough to be susceptible to 
meaningful review.
At the same time, if restrictions upon government actions in the area of nation­
al security are to be primarily procedural rather than substantive, these restrictions 
must involve both indirect, institutional accountability and direct public accounta­
bility. Even the most secret information must at some point be brought before the 
public, either by early release or in the fullness of time. In our view, the principle of 
public accountability would be well served with a system of statutory timelines for 
the release of even the most sensitive and controversial categories of information. 
The application of those timelines by government agencies should be a proper target 
of vigorous administrative and judicial review.
In the short term, systems of institutional accountability may be used to bal­
ance the competing interests of security and accountability. Ultimately, something
more is required. Nothing can replace direct public accountability, and mechanisms 
should be introduced to ensure that this becomes the norm, even in cases of national 
security. Whatever the judicial or parliamentary system chosen, we must honour the 
principle of public accountability.
Direct public accountability has the added benefit of decreasing the threat of 
instability. In addressing the need for state secrecy, we should understand that an 
interruption in the flow of information to the public can sometimes be the first step 
in a spiral of distorted communication leading to distrust and ultimately to vio­
lence.60 Leaving decisions on what constitutes “national security” issues to a small 
elite may be the breeding ground of dissent. Silence in a democracy is not golden; it 
may be the index of violence still to come.
Direct public accountability is thus not just one of several safeguards capable 
of being implemented; it is the only means by which public confidence can be 
restored once questions about the impartial administration of justice have been 
raised. By closing courtrooms and withholding information, governments ask us to 
accept on faith that they are acting in our best interests. In a genuine democracy, this 
is not acceptable. At the end of the day, direct public accountability is the sole final 
safeguard we have against the abuse of government power.
60 This type of concern is implicit in the transcribed remarks o f Jurgen Habermas in the weeks follow­
ing 9/11:
Precisely because our social relations are permeated by violence, strategic action and manipulation, 
there are two other facts we should not overlook. On the one hand, the praxis of our daily living togeth­
er rests on a solid base of common background convictions, self-evident cultural truths and reciprocal 
expectations. Here the coordination of actions runs through ordinary language games, through mutual­
ly raised and at least implicitly recognized validity claims in the public space of more or less good rea­
sons. On the other hand, due to this, conflicts arise from distortion in communications, from misun­
derstanding and incomprehension, from insincerity and deception. When the consequences of these 
conflicts become painful enough, they land in court or at the therapist’s office. The spiral of violence 
begins as a spiral of distorted communications that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal 
mistrust, to the breakdown of communication. If violence thus begins with a distortion of communica­
tion, after it has erupted it is possible to know what has gone wrong and what needs to be repaired.
Jürgen Habermas. Philosophy in a Time o f Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida, ed. by Giovanna Borradori. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) at 35.
